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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Joanna C. Blair appeals from both the Judgment of Conviction Upon a 
Plea of Guilty to One Felony Court, and Order of Retained Jurisdiction, I.C. 3 19- 
1 2601(4), I.C.R. 33(b), and Order of Commitment' and the separate Restitution 
Order entered upon her conviction by jury for grand theft. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinqs 
I Blair was convicted following a jury trial of one count of grand theft. (R., p. 
I 156.) At sentencing, the state requested restitution in the amount presented to 
the jury at trial. (Tr., p. 793, L. 24 - p. 794, L. 4.) The district court determined 
1 
I the restitution was appropriate based upon the evidence presented at trial and 
- 
I ordered Blair to pay the amount requested by the state. (Tr., p. 805, Ls. 1-7; R., 
I 
pp. 174-178, 179-180.) Blair timely appeals. (R., pp. 187-192.) 
' Following the initial entry of the Judgment of Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to 
One Felony Court, and Order of Retained Jurisdiction, I.C. § 19-2601(4), I.C.R. 
33(b), and Order of Commitment (R., pp. 174-178), the district court filed an 
Amended Judgment of Conviction Upon a Jury Verdict of Guilty to One Felony 
Count, and Order of Retained Jurisdiction, I.C. § 19-2601(4), I.C.R. 33(b), and 
Order of Commitment (R., pp. 182-186) which appears to mirror the first 
judgment of conviction in all but the title reflecting the nature of the conviction 
being as a result of a jury trial. 
ISSUE 
Blair states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court violate Ms. Blair's right to due process of law 
when it denied her motion for a restitution hearing and ordered 
restitution without allowing her to present evidence to challenge the 
restitution amount? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as follows: 
Has Blair failed to establish that the district court violated her right to due 
process in entering a restitution order based on the evidence presented at trial? 
ARGUMENT 
Blair Has Failed To Show That Her Riahts Were Violated BV The Entw Of A 
Restitution Order At Her Sentencina Hearina Based On The Evidence Presented 
At Jury Trial 
A. Introduction 
Blair argues on appeal that the district court violated her right to due 
process of law at sentencing. (Appellant's brief, p. 1.) Specifically, Blair argues 
that her rights were violated when the district court "denied her motion for a 
restitution hearing and ordered restitution at her sentencing hearing, without 
allowing her an opportunity to present evidence regarding the challenged 
restitution amount." (Appellant's brief, p. I.) 
Blair has failed to show-the-district court violated her rights in ordering 
restitution in an amount proven by the evidence presented at trial and upon 
which Blair was convicted. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review for claims of constitutional violations is one of 
deference to factual findings supported by substantial evidence, but we exercise 
free review in the application of the constitutional principles to the facts once 
established." State v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317, 322, 859 P.2d 353, 358 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
C. Blair Has Failed To Show Her Riahts Were Violated When The 
District Court Entered A Restitution Order Based Upon The Evidence 
Presented At Blair's Trial 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that "[nlo state shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. It 
is well understood that the Due Process Clause provides for certain procedural 
protections before a state may deprive a person of his property or his liberty. 
Stated another way, procedural due process requires that, except in 
extraordinary circumstances, a person must receive notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of any significant property or liberty 
interest. Rudd v. Rudd, 105 ldaho 112, 115, 666 P.2d 639, 642 (1983). 
Procedural due process is not a rigid concept but, rather, it "is flexible and calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Aeschliman 
v. State, 132 ldaho 397, 402, 973 P.2d 749, 754 (Ct. App. 1999). Blair's claim of 
a due process violation fails as she was afforded the right to be heard before the 
district court's entry of the restitution order in this case. 
I.C. § 19-5304 provides that "[rlestitution orders shall be entered by the 
court at the time of sentencing or such later date as deemed necessary by the 
court." I.C. 3 19-5304 (6). Further, the statute provides 
Economic loss shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence 
submitted to the court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or 
presentence investigator. Each party shall have the right to present 
such evidence as may be relevant to the issue of restitution, and 
the court may consider such hearsay as may be contained in the 
presentence report, victim impact statement or otherwise provided 
to the court. 
I.C. § 19-5304 (6). "The appropriate amount of restitution is a question of fact for 
the trial court, whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial 
evidence." State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114, 190 P.3d 930, 933 (Ct. App. 
2008). 
Blair claims the district court denied her due process when it did not grant 
her request for a separate restitution hearing and "ordered restitution without 
allowing her to present evidence to challenge the restitution amount." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) Blair's claim fails because she had already fully availed 
herself of the opportunity "to present such evidence as may be relevant" when 
she presented a detailed defense to the charge that she had embezzled funds 
from her employer. As such, the district court's determination of the appropriate 
amount of restitution is supported by the substantial evidence it considered while 
presiding over the three-day jury trial. 
In this case, a jury convicted Blair of stealing from her employer after 
hearing evidence presented over a three-day period. The witnesses who 
testified included the co-owners and the office manager of the business Blair 
stole from when employed as their bookkeeper. (See generally Tr., pp. 92-678.) 
These witnesses provided extensive testimony to establish Blair made 
unauthorized adjustments to her pay, wrote unauthorized checks to herself and 
others. and took funds she was not entitled to or authorized to take from the 
business. 
In direct response to the evidence presented by the state, Blair herself 
took the stand to refute all allegations that she took money from the company 
that was not due her. (See generally Tr., pp. 456-666.) Specifically, after going 
through timecards and checks and pay stubs in detail, Blair testified that she 
never made unauthorized adjustments to her pay, never wrote unauthorized 
checks to herself or others. and never took funds that she was not entitled to or 
authorized to take from the company. (Tr., p. 598, L. 16 - p. 599, L. 4.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the state requested restitution in the amount of 
the loss to Blair's employer, the same amount that it had established with the 
presentation of its evidence at trial. (Tr., p. 793, L. 24 - p. 794, L. 4.) Blair 
objected and requested a separate hearing on restitution, but did not identify 
what evidence, in addition to the evidence she presented when fighting the 
conviction itself, she still wished to present. In fact, before objecting to the 
amount of restitution and requesting a separate hearing, Blair's counsel 
acknowledged the thoroughness of the evidence she presented at trial: 
Obviously, Miss Blair testified at her trial. She explained her 
position. She explained, you kno:.j, why she did what she did. Shz 
explained why she signed the checks that she signed. She 
explained on each and every one of the checks, you know, 
probably a little ad nauseam why each of those checks was written 
and what each was for and why she felt she was authorized to 
make out each of them. She explained why she felt that she was 
authorized to give herself a raise. She explained a conversation 
which, of course, now her boss didn't remember. Of course, it was 
a very short conversation. She didn't go to the trouble of getting 
verification of it from her boss. But, she explained why she felt that 
she really had been authorized to give herself a raise. 
(Tr., p. 794, Ls. 11-25.) Her position at sentencing and in objection to the 
amount of restitution simply summarized her defense at trial: "Miss Blair does 
feel that she, you know, a lot of that money that was paid was because she was 
owed it." (Tr., p. 799, Ls. 14-16.) The court ordered the restitution as requested 
by the state: 
I will impose restitution of $5,831.43. That is the figure that is 
consistent with the testimony presented at trial. I am not going to 
grant you a restitution hearing in this case. There is nothing to 
have a hearing about. I make findings based upon the trial 
evidence that that is an appropriate restitution figure. 
(Tr., p. 805, Ls. 1-7.) 
I.C. § 19-5304 requires only that "each party shall have the right to present 
such evidence as may be relevant to the issue of restitution," not that each party 
in entitled to a separate restitution hearing when the parties have already 
presented such evidence. Here, the district court presided over a three-day trial 
and heard all of the evidence presented in support of the state's request for the 
restitution amount as well as that presented by Blair contradicting her theft of 
over five thousand dollars from her employer. When presented with the 
restitution amount at sentencing, the court found that it was supported by the trial 
testimony and ordered Blair responsible for the full amount. The court made 
findings based on the evidence presented at trial that the amount had been 
proven. (Tr., p. 805, Ls. 1-7.) The evidence was extensive and included 
witnesses for the state and witnesses for Blair, including Blair herself, testifying 
about specific amounts which were the subject of the grand theft charge. Blair's 
position at sentencing that "a lot of that money that was paid was because she 
was owed it," (Tr., p. 799, Ls. 15-16), is the same argument she made when she 
testified at her trial. (a generally Tr., p. 481, L. 9 - p. 498, L. 20 (Blair's 
testimony regarding her financial problems and her need to work overtime in 
contravention to company policy or get a raise in order to pay her personal bills).) 
Blair was afforded the right to present "such evidence as may be relevant 
to the issue of restitution" and has not identified what additional evidence she 
would present if given a separate hearing. Instead, she argues that her goal at 
trial was different, in that she was trying to prove her innocence and not trying to 
prove the appropriate amount of restitution. (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) However, at 
trial, Blair's defense was that she did not steal any of the money she was alleged 
to have stolen, that "a lot of the money that was paid was because she was owed 
it," and her defense was detailed in its direct refutation of the state's evidence. 
That her goal was different at trial does not alter the fact that the evidence she 
presented at trial as her defense is exactly what the statute affords her the right 
to present to the district court when it determines restitution: "such evidence as 
may be relevant to the issue of restitution." I.C. Cj 19-5304 (6). 
Blair was found guilty by a jury verdict of stealing in excess of one 
thousand dollars from her employer. That verdict was made upon instructions 
requiring the jury to find Blair guilty beyond reasonable doubt. (R., p. 127.) 
Restitution amounts are determined on evidence of "economic loss ... based 
upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court." I.C. Cj 19-5304 (6). 
The court, who presided over the three-day jury trial and heard all of the 
evidence in support of and in opposition to the state's presentation of the amount 
of money Blair stole, made a finding that the $5,831.43 requested was supported 
by the trial testimony. As Blair has not identified what other evidence relevant to 
the issue of restitution she would have presented if afforded another opportunity. 
She has therefore failed to establish any violation of her right to due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court uphold the restitution as 
ordered. 
DATED this 12th day of May 20 
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